Blog DomainTools Research

Identifying Critical Infrastructure Targeting through Network Creation

Background

In addition to independent investigations, DomainTools closely tracks the work of other respected researchers to see what we might miss in our own efforts. Recently,we learned of possible new infrastructurerelated to the threat actor known asOilRig(aka,APT34orHelix Kitten). In these situations, DomainTools worksto understand the backgroundfor such infrastructure and any tendencies which may be revealed by their creation in order to learn how given adversaries operate.

Aside from learning about adversaries, such efforts may also yield new, independent results through further research and analysis. In this case, a preliminary search of DomainTools data yielded a number of interesting, related results to the initial domain:

Domain Create Date Email IP Address ISP
7hillsgastro[.]com 2020-10-19 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
ababab[.]biz 2020-10-02 [email protected] 103.19.1.142 xTom Japan
alcirineos[.]com 2020-10-05 [email protected] N/A N/A
amazon-loveyou[.]com 2020-11-12 [email protected] 141.136.36.251 Vardas.lt UAB
bargertextiles[.]com 2020-10-27 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
berqertextiles[.]com 2020-10-27 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
careers-ntiva[.]com 2020-11-25 N/A 108.62.118.233 Ubiquity Server Solutions Chicago
cererock[.]com 2020-11-02 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
chinaconstructioncorp[.]com 2020-11-15 [email protected] 77.55.219.100 Nazwa.pl Sp.z.o.o.
clearinghouseinternational[.]com 2020-10-17 [email protected] 50.63.202.92 GoDaddy.com LLC
connect-roofing[.]com 2020-11-25 N/A N/A N/A
exmngt[.]com 2020-11-18 [email protected] 198.54.117.197 Namecheap Inc.
hoganlouells[.]com 2020-11-16 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
hscminkjet[.]com 2020-10-27 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
huopay[.]top 2020-10-11 [email protected] 103.19.1.142 xTom Japan
indeptheva[.]com 2020-10-05 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
jiabolianjie0[.]com 2020-10-01 [email protected] 158.247.204.149 Choopa LLC
jinkangpu[.]co 2020-11-04 [email protected] N/A N/A
jlrootfile[.]com 2020-10-20 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
kent-lawfirm[.]net 2020-11-12 N/A 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
klwebsrv[.]com 2020-11-26 N/A N/A N/A
oculus-au[.]info 2020-11-18 [email protected] N/A N/A
pet188[.]biz 2020-10-16 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
petrochinas[.]com 2020-11-15 [email protected] 77.55.208.23 Nazwa.pl Sp.z.o.o.
renrenbaowang[.]com 2020-10-28 [email protected] 156.253.10.173 Ruiou International Network Limited
renrenbaowang[.]net 2020-10-28 [email protected] 156.253.10.173 Ruiou International Network Limited
superrnax[.]com 2020-10-15 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
svn-stone[.]com 2020-10-23 [email protected] N/A N/A
us-customs[.]org 2020-10-28 [email protected] 69.64.147.39 Enom Incorporated
virtual-slots[.]com 2020-10-23 [email protected] 208.91.197.91 Confluence Networks Inc
virtualcaresadvisor[.]com 2020-10-02 [email protected] 208.91.197.91 Confluence Networks Inc.
wilsonconts[.]com 2020-11-09 [email protected] N/A N/A
wiqzi[.]com 2020-10-24 [email protected] 193.239.84.207 M247 Europe SRL
zj-tunq[.]com 2020-11-18 [email protected] N/A N/A

Several items stood out in the above list of related infrastructure, notably related to common email addresses linked to registrations:

  • cjay006[AT]yandex[.]com
  • ch1styjoe[AT]yandex[.]com
  • diandianlai[AT]yandex[.]com
  • lovelead247[AT]yandex[.]com

Using DomainTools Iris, each of these observed email addresses become a launchpad for investigating additional, related infrastructure. Although at this point connections appear too weak to definitively tie activity back to OilRig behaviors, which is where this investigation began, we have nonetheless reached an interesting and potentially useful intermediate conclusion by identifying linked, suspicious network infrastructure.

识别网络基础设施

Most notable among the common items above are those linked to the “cjay006” address:

Domain Email IP Address Mail Exchange
anhuisiafu[.]com [email protected] N/A mailhostbox.com
boardexecutivemanagement[.]com [email protected] N/A mailhostbox.com
boardsexecutives[.]com [email protected] 198.54.117.197 mailhostbox.com
chinaconstructioncorp[.]com [email protected] 77.55.219.100 chinaconstructioncorp.com
cornerstoneconect[.]com [email protected] 77.55.217.184 cornerstoneconect.com
exmngt[.]com [email protected] 198.54.117.197 mailhostbox.com
groupsexecutive[.]com [email protected] 46.28.109.165 groupsexecutive.com
lavalingroup[.]com [email protected] 77.55.233.217 lavalingroup.com
mngtboard[.]com [email protected] 46.28.109.164 mailhostbox.com
petrochinas[.]com [email protected] 77.55.216.70 petrochinas.com
stagmein[.]pl [email protected] N/A N/A

Several themes emerge in the above list,looking at the actual names usedfor domain creation:

  • 模仿企业或行政主题(例如,“boardsexecutives,” “mngtboard”).
  • Themes linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (e.g., “chinaconstructioncorp,” “petrochinas,” “anhuisiafu”).
  • Construction or engineering company spoofing (in addition to “chinaconstructioncorp,” “lavalingroup” is similar to Canadian engineering companySNC-Lavalin).

Hosting patterns aside, reviewing registration and DNS data showed that some domains featured interesting Mail Exchange (MX) records referring back to the original domain. As described in previous DomainTools blogs,identifying certain hosting and functional characteristicsto infrastructure can yield insights into adversary activity. In this case, the presence of the MX records, especially for items such as the construction-themed domains, may indicate use for phishing purposes.

Unearthing a Phishing Campaign

Researching several malware repositories, DomainTools researchers uncovered multiple emails sent from the infrastructure described in the previous section. Reviewed messages are similar to the following item:

Email sent from malicious infrastructure

Email messages had the following purpose and themes:

  • Addressed to either the Russian state nuclear energy firmROSATOMor its nuclear fuel production subsidiaryTVEL.
  • Written in Chinese with a “password reset” theme.
  • Sent from the SNC-Lavalin spoofing domain.

Furthermore, all samples identified by DomainTools contained a link to a common resource:

hXXp://iafflocal290[.]org/sapm/Poland/china[.]php

The page presents a logon screen:

Login Page presented on iafflocal290[.]org

The page appears to be a straightforward credential harvester, submitting credentials entered into the form fields as a POST to the same hosting domain. The domain itself appears to be either an abandoned or compromised legitimate website associated with a local fire department in the United States.

Further research identified the above as a common spoofed logon page for likely credential harvesting purposes. Among other entities identified, DomainTools researchers uncovered pages targeting:

  • A major automobile manufacturer.
  • A major automotive parts supplier.
  • An Internet-of-Things (IoT) technology company.

Purpose and Context

The activity above is interesting on several levels. While Canadian-based SNC-Lavalin has operations worldwide,including in the nuclear industry, the company has no known links to Rosatom, TVEL, or Chinese nuclear projects. However,RosatomandTVELhave significant operations involving Chinese reactorconstruction and development. Based on these links, DomainTools assesses some possibility for phishing themes combining Russian nuclear organizations with Chinese construction and critical infrastructure entities against individuals working on such projects.

Yet the samples in question all leverage the Lavalin theme, which does not align with any known projects or activity. The combination of Canadian engineering company spoofing, Russian nuclear technology targeting, and Chinese language phishing messages is therefore somewhat confusing.

Further research identified the credential harvesting pages associated with other entities, largely with technology or manufacturing themes. Based on this information, a likely intention for the Lavalin-ROSATOM campaign would appear to be credential harvesting to further follow-on espionage and data theft. Unfortunately, insufficient evidence exists to definitively support this claim.

While this investigation began by pivoting off of infrastructure linked to OilRig— associated withIranian interestsby multiple entities—there is nothing conclusive linking the identified phishing activity to behaviors associated with Iranian threat groups. This is especially the case after uncovering the additional, similarly-structured logon pages targeting other industries. At this time DomainTools cannot align the observed phishing activity with any known, tracked threat actor.

Conclusion

猎人和研究人员需要将威胁third-party findings and investigations into their own work to expand horizons and ingest new observations for subsequent enrichment. By expanding upon identified work and threat indicators, researchers can unearth related or potentially even completely separate campaigns that happen to overlap in certain characteristics.

Such is the case with the above investigation, where initial analysis of likely OilRig-related observables revealed a phishing campaign targeting the Russian nuclear industry with Chinese language characteristics, as well as several other manufacturing and technology companies. While much remains unknown about this newly identified campaign, we as threat researchers now have awareness of and insight into the activity that was previously unknown based on dogged analysis and enrichment of third-party research.